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Abstract:We propose an intuitive understanding of the statement: ‘an ax-
iom (or: an axiomatic basis) determines the meaning of the only specific
constant occurring in it.’ We introduce some basic semantics for func-
tors of the category sn,n of Les´niewski’s Ontology. Using these results we
prove that the popular claim that the axioms of Ontology determine the
meaning of the primitive constants is false.
1 
1.1 
Intuitively, in a slogan, when we give axioms for a given axiomatic system one
of our purposes is to characterize constants occurring in these axioms. Follow-
ing this idea, axioms of Les´niewski’s Ontology aim to characterize ‘univocally’
the primitive constants of this system. Usually, there is only one such a con-
stant specific to Ontology; it is ε (sometimes, there are other constants: see
Lejewski [9]). Hence, Lejewski writes:
In the original system of Ontology . . . the meaning of the copula ‘is’
(‘ε’ in symbols) is determined axiomatically . . . [10, p. 323]
Our purpose will be to investigate, whether in fact axiomatizations of Ontology
determine a unique semantic interpretation of the primitive constant(s) of this
∗I would like to thank Dr Jarosław Mrozek, Magda Baranowska, Adam Trybus—these are
people who have inspired my work in the last year. I am grateful for remarks addressed to me
by: Prof. A. W. Mostowski, Dr Richard Zach, and an anonymous referee of the Australasian
Journal of Logic. Please address any remarks to: ninghijz@wp.pl.
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axiomatizations. In order to proceed, we shall (i) introduce the language we will
be talking about (ii) say what axioms and rules of inference were accepted in
Ontology in some axiomatizations, (iii) present some possible interpretations
of quantifiers in Ontology, (iv) explain what is meant by ’semantic interpreta-
tion of a given functor’, and, when it will be done, (v) obtain the answer for the
main problem.
1.2   ()
In our deliberations we will use a basic language which is somewhat simpler
than the full language of Ontology. It will nevertheless allow us to give a short
statement of the essential results of our paper. We will suggest a possible way
of extending our results to a richer language of Ontology. The presentation
of our language is a simplified version of the language presented in another
paper [21].
Let {a, b, c, a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c1, . . . , cn} be a set of name variables of
Ontology, say V . Next, we apply the following convention for variables in meta-
language: χ, χ1, . . . , χn represent sentential-expressions (including sentences
and sentential formulae); µ, ν, µ1, ν1, . . . , µn, νn represent name-variables.1 Let
also f, f1, . . . , fn, g, g1, . . . , gn represent functors of category sn,...,n . Some-
times we use in the meta-language other variables—their usage should be self-
explanatory.
We introduce the following language. Our language Lf is relativized to a
primitive functor f.
 1 Lf = 〈FSf, V, f,∧,¬,∀〉
where V is the already mentioned set of name variables of Lf, f is a primitive
functor of category sn1,n2 ; ¬, ∧ are classical extensional functors of Sentential
Calculus, here treated as primitive, ∀ is simply the universal quantifier. We
omit the definitions of ∃, ∨, →, ≡ by means of ∧,¬,∀, as any appropriate
definitions suffice.
FSf is the union of Sf, the set of sentences2 of Lf, together with Ff, the
set of propositional formulae of Lf. This means means that FSf is the least set
satisfying the following conditions:
1. If µ1, µ2 ∈ V then pµ1fµ2q ∈ FSf,
2. If pχ1q, pχ2q ∈ FSf then p¬χ1q, pχ1 ∧ χ2q ∈ FSf,
3. If pµq ∈ V and pχq ∈ FSf then p∀µχq ∈ FSf.
1We also use the symbols of the same shape as logical constants in meta-language for naming
these constants.
2For convenience, we do not distinguish between sentences and propositions.
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For the sake of simplicity  does not contain variables of any category other
than n, or constants other than name constants (introduced by means of the
rule of definition) or functors of categories: sn,n , ss , ss,s .
1.3   
The problem of interpretation of quantifiers in Ontology was discussed in the
technical literature [6, 7, 11, 12]. There is no unique solution upon which logi-
cians would agree (though much of the disagreement concerns technicalities).
The reason for such a controversy is the fact that the particular quantifier
cannot be interpreted existentially (the meaning of the universal quantifier is
also debatable, because of this) since we can prove in Ontology:
∃a¬ex(a)
where ‘ex’ is to be read: ‘exists’ [7, p. 315]. Therefore different ideas of inter-
preting quantifiers have been suggested. We list some of them below:3
1. - : Ruth Barcan Marcus [12, p. 252–
253] suggests that ‘∃xFx’ is to be read ‘Some substitution instance of ‘Fx’
is true’. Following this idea, Küng distinguishes between substitutional
and Les´niewskian reading of quantifiers:
(a)  : ∃aφ(a) is to be read:
If some α of the same category as a is taken to be substi-
tuted for the inscription equiform to a, the following is
asserted: φ(α).
(b) ´ : ∃aφ(a) is to be read:
For some extension which the inscriptions equiform with
a is taken to have, the following is asserted: φ(α).
2. / : Kielkopf distinguishes
some other interpretations of quantifiers which do not involve meta-
language [6].
(a) / : It consists in giving
a set of objects, and claiming that quantifiers refer to them, in the
sense, that ∃aφ(a) is to be read:
For some object α of the given domain, φ(α)
3While discussing the interpretation of quantifiers I could not use two important papers on
this issue [15, 16]. I regret that these papers were unavailable to me in the time of writing this
paper.
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(b) /- : We choose a
domain D and associate with D a non-empty set R called the realm.
The elements of R are not viewed as existing objects. They are
viewed as mind-dependent entities and not ‘fully existing objects’.
Then, a language is given an referential-non objectual interpretation
iff it is given a quasi-referential interpretation, as if R was a domain,
but the set of existing objects is D.
3. - : Urbaniak [21]. We indicate a
domain of D, considered to be the set of existing objects. The function
of valuation on name-variables takes subsets of D as values. If a name is
considered empty, then its denotation is ∅, the empty set.
Let us elaborate a while on the given possibilities of interpreting quantifiers.
We shall not consider how far a given interpretation is Les´niewskian. Instead,
we shall give some arguments that for our purpose it suffices to accept the
model-theoretic interpretation.
First, let us consider the substitutional interpretation. It is not quite clear
which names may be substituted for name variables. There are no ‘simple
names’. Names always belong to some language. Therefore, such an interpreta-
tion of quantifiers either forces us to relativize our understanding of quantifiers
to a given language, or requires that our quantifying involves implicit quantify-
ing over languages (for example, we could read a universal quantification over
a name variable as ‘for any name in any language . . . ’). Moreover, it is far from
being obvious that it is a really general understanding of quantifiers. What do
we mean? That we can be lacking names for extensions.
To any meaningful name we can attribute a set that is its extension. In this
way, every tautology (or valid expression) in the model-theoretic sense is a tau-
tology (valid formula) in the substitutional sense. The question is, whether the
implication in the other direction is true. The answer would be simple, if we
assumed the condition that for any possible extension there is a name. Prac-
tically, it seems, however, that we are lacking names. As Ajdukiewicz argues [1,
p. 138]:
Names of each language divide into simple and composed. There
is always a finite number of the simple ones, the composite names
are always finite combinations of simple names, hence names are
countably infinite in number.
If we simply take a universe containing the set of natural numbers (or any other
universe of the power ℵ0), according to Cantor’s Theorem, the number of sub-
sets of the universe will be greater than ℵ0. Hence, we would not have enough
names to name all subsets, though each such a subset is a good candidate to be
an extension of a name. Nevertheless, we can claim the following. If language
L fulfills the following requirement:
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For any formula of elementary theory of numbers, if this formula contains
exactly one free variable, there is in L a general name, extension of which is
identical with the set of numbers satisfying this formula.4
then it is true, that any formula of L valid in lexical sense, is valid in the se-
mantic sense.
The proof (which will not be described here fully) is based on the following
result of Hilbert and Bernays:
Each formula of predicate calculus with identity, which is satisfied
in some model, is also satisfied in a model in which the universe
is the set of natural numbers. Relations (including sets treated as
unary relations) attributed to predicates by interpretation are de-
signed by open formulae of elementary theory of numbers.
More remarks on this problem and the full proof of the above theorem can be
found in Pietruszczak [13].
From what has been said, it follows that if we accept the model–theoretic
interpretation, there is no loss of accuracy (in comparison with the substitu-
tional interpretation).
A similar situation occurs in the case of so-called Les´niewskian interpreta-
tion. Since each possible extension of a meaningful name is a set, the model-
theoretical interpretation does a good job. Moreover, it is not quite clear what
the essential difference between this interpretation and the model-theoretic
one—in terms of truth conditions—amounts to.5 Küng himself seems to agree
that his interpretation implicitly contains the model-theoretical one:
. . . general procedure for reading all the functors of Les´niewski’s
‘ontology’ in a way which is specifically Les´niewskian, . . . which
has at the same time the merit that it ‘implicitly’ contains the set-
theoretical interpretation of those functors. [7, p. 315]
Nevertheless, Küng’s interpretation may have some virtues that the model-
theoretical interpretation lacks:
In my opinion the question of how to read quantified statements is
of some consequence. The habit of givingmerely model—theoretic
interpretations and no intuitive paraphrases has tended to obscure
some subtle, but very important aspects of oblique speech. [7, p.
309]
4Elementary theory of numbers is what we can say about natural numbers in terms of ad-
dition, multiplication, identity, sentence connectors, quantifiers quantifying over natural num-
bers, and the names of natural numbers, without introducing the notion of set.
5To some degree it may depend on whether we accept that there can be extensions of no
actual names. This decision makes Les´niewskian interpretation either equivalent to the substi-
tutional one, or to the model-theoretic one.
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In this paper we are not interested in aspects of oblique speech and we need
a simple and user-friendly semantics. Fortunately, model theory formulated in
the frame of standard set theory comes to the rescue.6
Referential–objectual interpretation does not work, as far as we would like
the valuation function to be from name-variables into the domain of object con-
sidered as existing individuals. First, it would lead to existential interpretation
of particular quantifier. Next — it is not sure, how to interpret name-variables
as semantically connected with exactly one existing object.
Nevertheless, the main idea of this interpretation is explicitly and success-
fully developed in (Takeuti, [20]). This semantics assumes that elements of a
domain are sets (including the empty set which ‘corresponds’ to empty names).
It surely does the job Takeuti claims it does, but we can equivalently use the
model-theoretic semantics (developed below) which more emphasizes the fun-
damental role of individuals.
In the referential-non objectual interpretation the set of existing objects is
D anyway. The valuation of name-variables takes subsets of R as values. Never-
theless, the value of propositional expressions does not depend on whether a
value of a given name-variable is a non-empty subset of R \D, or the empty set.
Therefore, as far as we are interested in the truth of an expressions, we may as
well accept the model-theoretical interpretation.
1.4  
We now introduce the standard semantics for  of Ontology, assuming that
the primitive functor is ε.7
A model for Lf is a set OBJ, being a set of objects (interpreted as existing).
Let the variables of Lf be µ1, . . . , µn, we assume that their order is fixed. A
valuation of this variables is a sequence Au = 〈A1, . . . , An〉, where, for every
i, Ai is a subset of OBJ. Obviously, the value of µi in interpretation Au is Ai.
Sometimes, instead of Ai as the value of µi we shall write Vu(µi). For any
name constant α its value (a subset of OBJ) is the same for any valuation of
name variables.8 We shall refer to this value in a given OBJ by ‘V(α)’, where it
is clear which OBJ we mean. When it is not important whether α is a name
constant or a variable, we refer to its semantic value in a given OBJ in a given
valuation u of name variables by EVu(α).
6Of course, one can claim that we cannot use standard set theory in meta-theory of
Les´niewski’s systems, because Les´niewski did not believe in distributive sets.
I will try to show on an example thatmutatis mutandis the same results can be obtain within the
Les´niewskian philosophical framework. However, I will not proceed according to this method.
In this paper it would only complicate our reasonings.
7Wemight have chosen otherwise. However, it is not an essential decision, as far as all other
functors are definable by means of the primitive basis. The semantics for all other functors is
to be constructed according to the introduced definitions of these functors.
8This account will be modified while discussing the rule of definition in non-standard inter-
pretations.
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We define the standard notion of satisfaction: satisfactionε. It is import-
ant that the quantifiers of our meta-language are interpreted differently from
the quantifiers of our Lf. We interpret meta-language individual variables ref-
erentially (respective to OBJ).9
 2 We assume that the sequence of variables is fixed.
1. pµkεµiq is satisfiedε inOBJ by a valuationAu if and only if ∃!xx ∈ Ak∧Ak ⊆
Ai.
2. p¬χq is satisfiedε inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχq is not satisfiedε
inOBJ by the valuationAu.
3. pχi∧χjq is satisfiedε inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχiq is satisfiedε
inOBJ by the valuationAu and pχjq is satisfiedε inOBJ by the valuationAu.
4. p∀µkχq is satisfiedε inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχq is satisfiedε in
OBJ by any possible valuation Ad which is different from Au at most at the kth
place.
A propositional expression is a tautologyε iff it is satisfiedε in any domain
by any valuation.10 In general, if we use upper indices for a given notion of
satisfaction, say satisfactionψ, we say that validityψ consists in being satisfiedψ
in any domain by any valuation.
From now on, instead of saying ‘an expression ϕ is satisfiedψ in OBJ by the
valuation Aδ’ we say: ‘ϕ is SATψ,δOBJ’.
1.5  
We conduct a more careful definition of ontological functors elsewhere [21].
Here, our description will be simplified, but sufficient for our present purpose.
There are some specific functors which we would like to consider in this
paper, 2-placeOntological Functors (). They are those specific 2-place functors,
which distinguish Elementary Ontology from Prototetics. As it is obvious, these
functors are of syntactical category sn,n .
However, this information does not suffice for distinguishing 2-place s
from other functors of the same syntactical category. For example, we would
like to consider the expression ‘is’ in: ‘Socrates is mortal.’ an . This functor
is of the syntactical category sn,n ; but we can as well find a functor of the same
syntactical category, which surely is not an , e.g. the expression ‘loves’ in
‘John loves Mary.’ is not an , though it is of the category sn,n .
9We use the quantifier ∃! which is to be read: ‘there is exactly one’. Of course, it can be
defined in terms of the universal quantifier and identity.
10In fact, Les´niewski excluded propositional formulae from the set of theorems of his sys-
tem, so any tautology should be preceded by universal quantifiers binding the otherwise free
variables. For our purpose the matter is inessential.
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Hence we need some other condition (or a set of conditions), which would
not only be necessary, but also sufficient for a 2–place functor to be an .
The simplest intuition seems to be that s, concatenated (properly) to their
arguments, form expressions concerning the set–theoretical relations between
the denotations of their arguments, whereas those functors, which are not s,
do not. However, the situation is not so simple. We cannot say just that. Still
it would remain undecided, what is the nature of this ‘concern’.
What we would like first to stipulate, is some kind of extensionality. The
value of any proposition built from an  and its arguments should depend on
the extensions of these names only. We define the notion of coextensiveness
relation, relativized to the valuation Vu (we denote it in this paper by ‘ .=u ’):
 3 µ1 .=u µ2 ≡ Vu(µ1) = Vu(µ2)
Now, we can define the property of extensionality of functors of syntactical
category sn,n 11:
 4 A 2–place functor δ2 is extensional if and only if for all OBJ, µ1, µ2,
µ3, µ4, and u: If µ1 .=u µ2 and µ3 .=u µ4, then: (µ1δ2µ3 ≡ µ2δ2µ4) is Sε-satisfied
by valuation Vu.
It it is important that the semantic extensionality defined above is something
different from the extensionality of the rule of extensionality.
We also shall define the identity of 2–place extensional functors. Two 2–
place s, say δ12, δ22 are identical if and only if the truth conditions of sentences
obtained by them and their arguments are the same:
 5 δ12 = δ22 ≡ ∀µ1,µ2 [µ1δ12µ2 ≡ µ1δ22µ2]
The above definitions, mutatis mutandis apply to any k–place functors.
At first, it would perhaps look good to define Ontological Functors as those
k-place sentence-forming functors of name arguments, which are extensional.
However, it still does not suffice. Let us take the sentence ‘John loves Mary.’
As we have said, we do not want to count ‘loves’ as an ontological functor. Now,
it is possible to refer uniquely to John by means of other names. For example,
his worker, say Frank, refers to him by ‘boss’. John’s boss refers to him by,
say, ‘Mr Johnson’. The sentence ‘John loves Mary’ will not change its value if
we replace ‘John’ by ‘Mr Johnson’ or ‘Frank’s boss’. Similarly with all names
that uniquely refer to Mary. Hence, we obtain the result that ‘loves’ is also
extensional.
Therefore, we need something more. Once again, how to explicate the ‘set
theoretical concern’ of an ontological functor? We tentatively propose:
11In introducing this notion we proceed according to the way of defining extensionality in
(Borkowski, [2, p.197-198]), where he defines extensionality of s
n1,...,nk
predicates.
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 6 Functor f is a k-place ontological functor iff it is a sentence-forming
functor of k name-arguments, and f is definable in metalanguage by expression:
f(µ1, . . . , µk) is satisfied inOBJ byAu iff χ
where χ is a formula of set-theory with µ1, . . . , µk as the only free variables.
In this paper we shall be mainly concerned with 2–place s.
1.6 
Among axioms of Ontology that were given in the development of Ontology
we can distinguish axioms in which the only primitive specific functor of the
system is ε, and axioms which either introduce also other functors beside ε, or
introduce other functors instead of ε. Let us call the first ‘ε–axioms’, and the
others ‘⊂–axioms’.
Historically, Ontology was usually based on a single axiom, however, there
are at least a few possibilities of such an axiomatization. Let us list some main
known axiomatizations.
1.6.1 ε-
Historically, the following axioms (each one, as a single axiom of Ontology)
were suggested (Lejewski, [9, p. 135–136]):
 1 ∀a,b[aεb ≡ (∃ccεa∧ ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd)∧ ∀c(cεa→ cεb))]
The axiom 1 was firstly introduced by Les´niewski in 1920. In 1921 he proposed
another axiom:
 2 ∀a,b[aεb ≡ (∃c(cεa∧ cεb)∧ ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd))]
In the same year Sobocin´ski proved that equivalently we can accept as an ax-
iom:
 3 ∀a,b[aεb ≡ (∃c(cεa∧ cεb)∧ ∀c(cεa→ aεc))]
The next simplification was introduced by Les´niewski in 1929:
 4 ∀a,b(aεb ≡ ∃c(aεc∧ cεb))
1.6.2 ⊂–
Lejewski (Lejewski, [9, p. 137]) introduced an axiom:
 5 ∀a,b[aεb ≡ (∃c(cεb∧ ¬(cεa))∧ ∀c,d,e(cεd∧ dεe→ cεa∨ dεa))]
where the functor ε was introduced by the following definition:
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 7 ∀a,b(aεb ≡ ∃c(aεc∧ ¬(aεb)))
Functor ε is called the functor of singular exclusion. First, on the ground of formu-
lations of Ontology, where ε was the primitive functor, it was defined:
 8 ∀a,b(aεb ≡ (aεa∧ ¬(aεb)))
Sobocin´ski’s result tells us that we can accept the functor < as the only prim-
itive one functor of Ontology. This functor originally was introduced by the
definition:
 9 ∀a,b[a < b ≡ (∃ccεa∧ ∀c(cεa→ cεb))]
In Sobocin´ski’s formulation however, it was the only primitive functor. The
axiom was:
 6 ∀a,b[a < b ≡ (∃cc < a∧ ∀c(c < a∧ ∀d(d < c→ c < d) → c < b))]
and the functor ε was introduced by the definition:
 10 ∀a,b(aεb ≡ (a < b∧ ∀c(c < a→ a < c)))
In 1956 Lejewski has shown that we can use ⊂ as the only primitive functor. In
the original formulation it was defined:
 11 ∀a,b(a ⊂ b ≡ ∀c(cεa→ cεb))
In Lejewski’s formulation, ε was defined:
 12 ∀a,b[aεb ≡ (∃c¬(a ⊂ c)∧ a ⊂ b ∧
∀c,d,e(c ⊂ a∧ d ⊂ a→ (c ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e)))]
and Lejewski’s axiom (the second, shorter version) was:
 7 ∀a,b[a ⊂ b ≡ ∀c(c ⊂ a∧ ∀d,e(d ⊂ c→ c ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e) → c ⊂ b)]
1.7 
In different formulations of Ontology we can meet different bases of primit-
ive rules of inference. For instance, Luschei [11, p. 141] enumerates: rule(s)
of definition, distribution, detachment, substitution and extensionality. On
the other hand, Słupecki [17, pp. 75–79] equivalently lists: substitution, detach-
ment, omitting the universal quantifier, omitting the particular quantifier12,
adding the universal quantifier, adding the particular quantifier, the rule of
definition, and the rule of extensionality.
In our investigations we will be interested whether the above mentioned
rules are validity-preserving in non-standard interpretations of primitive func-
tors. In the presentation of rules, we shall follow the Słupecki’s account.
12Słupecki calls it ‘existential’. For the reasons already given, we choose another name.
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   The original Les´niewski’s account of this rule is a
little bit foreign to the modern logical language. His description of this rule
uses numerous technical terms of his own. We’ll try to give a simplified for-
mulation of this rule, which (when given with the rules of adding and omitting
quantifiers) does the same job as the original one.13
Let χ be a propositional expression with at least one free variable
ν of syntactic category σ. From χ infer an expression χ1 which
differs from χ in the following aspects:
1. Instead of each free occurrence of ν in χ there is an expres-
sion (simple or not) µ of the category σ.
2. It is not the case that there is in µ a free variable υ and ν
occurs in χ as a free variable within a range of a quantifier
binding υ.
In other words, we substitute for each free occurrence of a variable so that no
variable becomes bound.
 1 The rule of substitution is validity-preserving in , independently of the
choice of the interpretation of a primitive functor.
: In  the only variables which can be substituted for are name vari-
ables. They can be substituted either by name variables or by name con-
stants, as far as the latter have been introduced by means of the rule of
definition.
The semantics for name variables has been introduced. Semantics of
name constants is very intuitive: they denote for each OBJ a fixed subset
of a domain, and this denotation does not depend on the interpretation
of variables.
Now assume that a given expression χ of  is valid and ν is a free name
variable in χ. Then, obviously, χ is satisfied in any model; in any domain
and in any valuation, particularly in any interpretation of ν.
13Let’s take the Luschei’s translation of this description [11, pp. 252-253]. It has 14 points. For
the sake of example, I quote the 3rd and 9th:
(3) For every E and F, if E is d, F is a word inside the subquantifier of C, and
there are exactly as many d that precede E as words inside the subquantifier of C
that precede F, then, for at least one G, F is a variable of C bound by G or is an
expression equiform to E.
(9) For every E, if E is a term in A, then either (i) E is an argument or functor of
an ingredient of A and suited to be constant, relative to thesis B of this system;
(ii) for at least one F, E is a word inside F, and F is a universal quantifier in A; or
(iii) for certain F and G, F is in A, and E is a variable of generalization F bound by
G.
Clearly, a rule given in 14 points of similar style is not user-friendly.
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Now, let χ1 be a result of replacing ν in χ by µ. Since χ1 differs from
χ only in the form of one free variable, the conditions of validity of χ1
differ only in the fact that we talk about all possible interpretations of µ
instead of that of ν. In any model, possible different interpretations of µ
are exactly the same as possible interpretations of ν - namely all subsets
of a model’s domain. Hence, χ1 is also valid.
In the case of substituting a name variable by a name constant, the case
is even simpler. In general, if a formula is valid in any possible interpret-
ation of a given variable ν, in fact, it yields a valid result if we admit only
one interpretation of this variable (the intended denotation of the name
we want to substitute). ...
 It is interesting, how the above theorem can be extended to the full
language of Ontology. Let us sketch a possible and quite a simple way of doing
so, on the example of variables and constants of the category sn,n .
If we want to consider variables and constants of this category, it will be
convenient to introduce their ‘denotation’ or ‘valuation’. Name constants have
some fixed subsets of OBJ as denotations. Name variables have subsets of OBJ
as possible valuations. Accordingly, intuitive candidates for our job will be bin-
ary relations between the subsets of OBJ. Strictly speaking, not all possible
relations, but only the relations corresponding to definientes of possible defini-
tions of ontological functors, when a semantic interpretation of the primitive
basis is given.14
For example, the relation corresponding to the standard interpretation of ε
is the relation that takes place between two subsets of a given OBJ iff the first
is a singleton and a subset of the second. Relations corresponding to other,
non-primitive functors are to be settled in accordance with their definitions in
the system.
Clearly, -constants in a given model OBJ have fixed relations in 2OBJ as
semantic correlates. Valuations of -variables of a given language in a given
model will be sequences of (admissible) relations in 2OBJ. Semantic interpreta-
tion of quantifiers binding -variables is intuitive — it repeats the schema
for name variables, differing only in the set of admissible valuations of -
variables. Now, the proof that the rule of substitution for such variables is
validity-preserving should work in a similar manner as that for name-variables.
Full language of Ontology is not restricted only to these two kinds of vari-
ables and constants. It admits variables of any category built from n-s or s-s
and any constants of any admissible category, if these constants are introduced
by properly constructed definitions.
It seems that mutatis mutandis we can extend our semantics to let it account
for any admissible category (perhaps it would be then convenient to introduce
14For details concerning possible definitions of ontological functors etc. see (Urbaniak, [21]).
“Some non-standard interpretations of Les´niewski’s Ontology”, Australasian Journal of Logic (3) 2006, 13–46
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2006 25
explicitly 1 and 0 as semantic correlates of propositions). These are only tech-
nical details.15 Hence:
 1 The rule of substitution is validity-preserving in the full language of
Ontology.
   The rules governing the use of quantifiers are
very similar to that occurring in systems of natural deduction — for instance,
in the formulation introduced in (Borkowski, [2]).
Their validity16 is based, freely speaking, on the relations between quan-
tification, free variables and semantic correlates of expressions of a given cat-
egory, just as it is in first- or second-order predicate logic. Interpretation of
-constants does not interfere with their validity, hence:
 2 Rules governing the use of quantifiers are validity-preserving inde-
pendently on the interpretation of -constants.
Now, we will simply present the rules of definition and of extensionality.
Later on, we shall try to answer the question whether these rules preserve
validity in given non-standard interpretations.
   This rule is an axiomatic rule introducing implic-
ations of a specific form (so called laws of extensionality) to a system irrespective
of what theorems were subjoined thereto before. In its presentation we shall
follow (Słupecki, [17, p. 101]).
Let the variable χ represent propositional function (complex or
simple — what is important is the category of χ and not its com-
plexity) of one argument, and let the not equiform variables λ and
δ be admissible arguments of this function. Let χ(λ) and χ(δ) be
applications of χ to, respectively, λ and δ. The consequents of the
laws of extensionality have the form:
∀χ[χ(λ) ≡ χ(δ)]
The form of the antecedent depends on the category of λ and δ.
If they are nominal variables not having the form of the variable x,
the antecedent has the form:
∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ]
15Though it is interesting question, how to construct quite a simple semantics for the full
language of Ontology, which (semantics) would not only do its formal job, but also would work
in accordance with Les´niewski’s philosophical commitment, i.e. would not introduce other
entities than individuals.
16When there is no danger of ambiguity, we use ‘validity’ with reference to rules as a name of
the property of being validity-preserving.
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If λ and δ are functors of k arguments, and α1, . . . , αk are (i) argu-
ments of both λ and δ, (ii) none two of them are equiform, and (iii)
none has the form of the variable x, then we consider two possibil-
ities.
1. Both λ and δ are name-formative. Then, the antecedent has
the form:
∀x,α1,...,αk [xελ(α1, . . . , αk) ≡ xεδ(α1, . . . , αk)]
2. Both λ and δ are proposition-formative. Then, the antecedent
has the form:
∀α1,...,αk [λ(α1, . . . , αk) ≡ δ(α1, . . . , αk)]
   We shall first present this rule for nominal constants
and name-formative or proposition-formative functors of nominal arguments
according to (Słupecki, [17, pp. 74–75]), and then extend it to the full language
of Ontology, following (Słupecki, [17, pp. 100–101]).
1. The schema for defining a nominal constant, say α, is as fol-
lows:
∀b(bεα ≡ bεb∧ χ)
where χ is a propositional expression of .
2. The schema for a definition of a proposition-formative func-
tor, say λ, of nominal arguments is:
λ(b1, . . . , bn) ≡ χ
where χ is as before.
3. The schema for defining a name-formative functor, say δ, is
as follows:
bεδ(b1, . . . , bn) ≡ bεbi ∧ χ
where 0 6 i 6 n and χ is as above.
In definitions other than these above only functors are defined.
These functors are either proposition-formative or name-formative.
The forms of definitions do not differ essentially from the above
schemata, but the functors of the full language of Ontology may
depend on parameters. These parameters are placed inside paren-
theses differing in shape from those enclosing arguments of func-
tors. For every variable acting as a parameter of a functor, the
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definiens of the definition of this functor has to include a free vari-
able equiform to that occurring in the parameter, and every vari-
able acting as a parameter differs in form from all other variables
appearing in the definiendum. The rule of substitution may affect
parameters as well.
This rule, even for , is a cause of problems which throw some light on
some interesting issues, which will be discussed later on.
2    
The Standard Semantics of Ontology consists in accepting the satisfactionε as
the notion of satisfaction for the ε functor. This interpretation of ε consists in
the following underlying intuition:
Let a, b be names. The expression aεb is true if and only if a is
an unshared name (i. e. having exactly one designate) and, either
b is an unshared name of the object named by a, or b is a shared
name (i. e. having more than one designate) naming also the object
named by a.
This interpretation is accepted by numerous logicians.17
What is more interesting, almost all of them explicitly claim that this mean-
ing of ε functor is determined by the Axiom 1 (Słupecki, [17, p. 72–73], Lejewski,
[9, p. 135–136], Hiz˙, [4, p. 273]); perhaps (Iwanus´, [5, p. 168–169]) is the most
exemplary:
The only primitive term of ontology is the constant ‘ ε ’, its mean-
ing is determined by the following axiom . . .
similarly, (Lejewski, [10, p. 323]):
. . . the meaning of the copula ‘is’ (‘ ε ’ in symbols) is determined
axiomatically . . .
What does it mean that an axiom determines the meaning of the primitive
constant? Such a claim is an equivalence, which states that
1. If we accept the ‘determined’ meaning of the constant, the axiom is valid.
2. If the axiom is valid, then the constant has the such ‘determined’ mean-
ing.
17E.g.: (Borkowski, [2, p. 188]), (Sobocin´ski, [19, p. 14]), (Lejewski, [8, p. 54–55]), (Lejewski,
[9, p. 129]) , (Słupecki, [17, p. 65–66]), (Canty, [3, p. 149–151]).
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In the first point the mentioned adherents are right, in the sense, that in the
Standard Semantic the Axiom 1 (and other axioms) are validε in the standard
interpretation of ε.
Our purpose is to show that they are wrong in the second claim — we shall
argue that we can understand ε in at least ℵ0 different ways and keep axioms
valid in this interpretations.
We must also point out that it is not clear, whether the expression ‘determ-
ined by an axiom’ means the same as ‘determined axiomatically’. The second
expression can be quite legitimately interpreted as ‘determined by axiomatic
basis, i.e. by axiom(s) and rule(s) of a given system’. In the second sense, we
must also consider additional two conditions.
1. If we attribute to a constant the standard interpretation, all rules pre-
serve validity.
2. If the validity of rules is to be preserved, the constant has to have the
standard interpretation.
In other words, for a given axiomatic basis and for any non-standard inter-
pretation we will be interested not in one, but in two questions. First, whether
its axiom is valid in this interpretation of the primitive constant, and second,
whether all rules preserve validity in this interpretation of this constant.18
Adherents of the uniqueness of the admissible interpretation of ε can re-
main unconvinced when they are shown a non-standard interpretation which
preserves axiom(s). However, non-standard interpretations which not only
keep axiom(s) valid, but also make rules validity-preserving, may be for them
really troublesome.
In this paper we shall not only show that there are non-standard interpreta-
tions which keep axiom(s) safe (it is our first purpose), but also we shall discuss,
whether in these interpretations rules of Ontology are validity-preserving.
3 -   
3.1 SΦ  ε–
Let us instead of satsifactionε accept the following definition of satisfaction:
 13 We assume that the sequence of variables is fixed.
1. pµkεµiq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by a valuationAu if and only ifAk = Ai = Φ.
2. p¬χq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχq is not satisfiedΦ
inOBJ by the valuationAu.
18Note that, though we discuss soundness in non-standard interpretations. It is an interesting
question which we shall not discuss in this paper, whether Ontology is a sound and complete
theory in some non-standard interpretation.
“Some non-standard interpretations of Les´niewski’s Ontology”, Australasian Journal of Logic (3) 2006, 13–46
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2006 29
3. pχi∧χjq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχiq is satisfiedΦ
inOBJ by the valuationAu and pχjq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by the valuationAu.
4. p∀µkχq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by the valuation Au if and only if pχq is satisfiedΦ
in OBJ by any possible valuation Ad which is different from Au at most at the
kth place.
As an obvious consequence of the standard definition of particular quantifier,
we may add:
p∃µkχq is satisfiedΦ in OBJ by a valuation Au if and only if pχq is
satisfiedΦ in OBJ by some possible valuation Ad which is different
from Au at most at the kth place.
 2 Axiom 1 is validΦ.
: Implication to the right: We assume that aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ. It is to be
proven, that ∃ccεa∧∀c,d(cεa∧dεa→ cεd)∧∀c(cεa→ cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Since aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ, Vu(a) = Vu(b) = Φ. There is a valuationAs which
differs from Au at most in the fact that the Vs(c) = Φ such that cεa is
SATΦ,sOBJ. Hence, ∃ccεa is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Now we shall show that with this assumptions
∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd)
is SATΦ,uOBJ. Let us assume that cεa ∧ dεa is SATΦ,uOBJ. Since, as we have
said, Vu(a) = Φ, it must be the case that also Vu(c) = Vu(d) = Φ. If
this is the case, also cεd is SATΦ,uOBJ.
It remains to show that on the ground of our assumptions,
∀c(cεa→ cεb)
is SATΦ,uOBJ. To do so, assume that cεa is SATΦ,uOBJ. Then, obviously,
Vu(c) = Vu(a) = Φ. Since, according to our previous assumption,
Vu(b) = Φ, we obtain Vu(c) = Vu(b) = Φ. It follows that cεb is SATΦ,uOBJ,
what ends the proof in one direction.
Implication to the left: We assume that
∃ccεa∧ ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd)∧ ∀c(cεa→ cεb)
is SATΦ,uOBJ, and obtain in consequence that aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Since ∃ccεa, there is a valuationAs differing at most in the value assigned
to c such that cεa is SATΦ,sOBJ. Therefore, Vs(c) = Vs(a) = Φ Since As
differs from Au only in Vs(c), it is the case that Vu(a) = Φ. Let us
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now notice that ∀c(cεa → cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ. As we have said, there is a
valuation As differing at most in the value assigned to c such that cεa
is SATΦ,sOBJ. Hence, cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. It means that Vs(c) = Vs(b) = Φ.
But As differs from Au at most in the value assigned to c. Therefore
Vs(b) = Vu(b) = Φ. Hence Vu(a) = Vu(b) = Φ. It means that aεb
is SATΦ,uOBJ, what ends the proof (if we take under consideration that we
can repeat our proof for any OBJ and any valuation). ...
The proof given above may be stated in a more intuitive, but less precise and
not quite exact manner.
Implication to the right: Assume aεb. Hence, both a and b are empty names.
Therefore, bεa. If it is so, then also ∃ccεa. Now assume cεa∧ dεa. then, both
c and d are empty. Hence cεd. Therefore, ∀c,d(cεa ∧ dεa → cεd). Assume
cεa. Then c is empty. As we have said, b is also empty. therefore also cεb. So,
∀c(cεa→ cεb) .
Implication to the left: Assume
∃ccεa∧ ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd)∧ ∀c(cεa→ cεb)
If ∃ccεa, it means that some name is empty together with a. So a is empty.
Since ∀c(cεa → cεb), every name which is empty together with a is empty
together with b. If a is empty together with itself, a is empty together with b.
In fact, aea; hence aεb, which ends the proof.
What we would like to show is that it does not matter which axiom we
choose, our non-standard interpretation of ε makes this axiom valid.
One could argue that we do not have to prove it independently for each
axiom. It has been already shown that those axioms are on the ground of
Ontology equivalent, so the first proof suffice for our purpose. Nevertheless,
we would like to obtain our results independently of the results concerning
rules of Ontology.
 3 Axiom 2 is validΦ.
: Implication to the right: Assume that aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ. Then, Vu(a) =
Vu(b) = Φ. There is the valuation As which differs from Au at most in
the fact that Vs(c) = Φ such that the formula cεa∧cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. Since
Au differs from As only in the valuation of c, ∃c(cεa∧ cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Let us now assume that cεa ∧ dεa is SATΦ,uOBJ. This means that Vu(c) =
Vu(a) = Vu(d) = Φ. Obviously, then cεd is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Therefore, ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: Assume ∃c(cεa ∧ cεb) ∧ ∀c,d(cεa ∧ dεa → cεd) is
SATΦ,uOBJ. If ∃c(cεa∧cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ, then there is a valuationAs differing
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from Au at most in the value assigned to c such that cεa∧cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ.
Therefore, Vs(c) = Vs(a) = Vs(b) = Vu(a) = Vu(b) = Φ. Hence, aεb
is SATΦ,uOBJ, what (since we can reason in the same way for any model and
any valuation) ends the proof. ...
Of course, there is also the ‘light’ version of this reasoning.
Implication to the right: Assume aεb. Then a and b are empty. Since, a is empty
together with itself, aεa. Hence, aεa∧ aεb. Therefore, ∃c(cεa∧ cεb).
Now assume cεa∧ dεa. Then, obviously, a, c, d are together empty. Hence
cεd.
Implication to the left: Assume
∃c(cεa∧ cεb)∧ ∀c,d(cεa∧ dεa→ cεd)
Since ∃c(cεa ∧ cεb) there is a name which is together empty with a and b.
Therefore, a and b are both empty. Hence aεb, what ends the reasoning.
 4 Axiom 3 is validΦ.
: Implication to the right: Assume aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ. Hence Vu(a) =
Vu(b) = Φ. There is a valuation As which differs from Au at most in
the fact that Vs(c) = Φ. The formula cεa ∧ cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. Since Au
differs from As only in the valuation of c, ∃c(cεa∧ cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Assume moreover that for some k, cεa is SATΦ,kOBJ. It means that Vk(c) =
Vk(a) = Φ. It is obvious that then aεc is SATΦ,kOBJ.
Hence ∀c(cεa→ aεc) is SATΦ,ψOBJ .
Implication to the left: Assume ∃c(cεa ∧ cεb)∧ ∀c(cεa → aεc) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
If ∃c(cεa ∧ cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ, then there is a valuation As differing from
Au at most in the value assigned to c such that cεa ∧ cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ.
Therefore, Vs(c) = Vs(a) = Vs(b) = Vu(a) = Vu(b) = Φ. Hence, aεb
is SATΦ,uOBJ, what (since we can reason in the same way for any model and
any valuation) ends the proof. ...
 5 Axiom 4 is validΦ.
: Implication to the right: Assume that aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ. Hence Vu(a) =
Vu(b) = Φ. There is a valuation As which differs from Au at most in the
fact that Vs(c) = Φ. The formula aεc∧ cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. Since Au differs
from As only in the valuation of c, ∃c(aεc∧ cεb) is SATΦ,sOBJ.
Implication to the left: Assume that ∃c(aεc∧cεb) is SATΦ,uOBJ. Hence, there
is a valuationAs which differs fromAu at most in the fact that Vs(c) = Φ,
such that aεc ∧ cεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. If it is so, Vs(a) = Vs(c) = Vs(b) = Φ
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Since, as we have said,As differs fromAu at most in the fact that Vs(c) =
Φ, it is also the case that Vu(a) = Vu(b) = Φ. Therefore, aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ.
We can repeat this reasoning for any OBJ and any Au, what ends the
proof. ...
3.2 F  ε–
Let us instead of satsifactionΦ interpret ε as falsum functor, which always
yields 0 as value for any arguments. Therefore we accept the following defini-
tion of satisfactionF:
 14 We assume that the sequence of variables is fixed.
1. pµkεµiq is satisfiedF in OBJ by a valuation Au if and only if
Ak 6= Ak.
2. p¬χq is satisfiedF inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχq is not satisfiedF
inOBJ by the valuationAu.
3. pχi∧χjq is satisfiedF inOBJ by the valuationAu if and only if pχiq is satisfiedF
inOBJ by the valuationAu and pχjq is satisfiedF inOBJ by the valuationAu.
4. p∀µkχq is satisfiedF in OBJ by the valuation Au if and only if pχq is satisfiedF
in OBJ by any possible valuation Ad which is different from Au at most on one
place, namely k− th (place).
As an obvious consequence of the standard definition of particular quantifier,
we may add:
p∃µkχq is satisfiedF in OBJ by the valuation Au if and only if pχq is
satisfiedF in OBJ by some possible valuation Ad which is different
from Au at most at the kth place.
 6 Axiom 1 is validF.
: Implication to the right: Assume that aεb is SATF,uOBJ. Since, from the
semantic interpretation of ε, aεb cannot be SATF,uOBJ, we, by p∧¬p→ q,
obtain the right side of the equivalence.
Implication to the left: Assume that the conjunction on the right side is
SATF,uOBJ. Hence, ∃ccεa is SATF,uOBJ. Therefore, there exists the valuation
As that differs from Au at most in the assignment for c, such that cεa is
SATF,sOBJ. Since it cannot occur, according to our interpretation of ε, by
p ∧ ¬p → q we obtain the left side of the equivalence. The reasoning is
repeatable for any model and any valuation. ...
 7 Axiom 2 is validF.
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: Implication to the right: Assume aεb is SATF,uOBJ. But aεb cannot be
SATF,uOBJ. Hence, the right side of the equivalence in the axiom also is
SATF,uOBJ(since — in classical logic at least — contradiction implies any
proposition).
Implication to the left: Assume ∃c(cεa∧ cεb) is SATF,uOBJ. Therefore, cεa∧
cεb is satisfiedF in OBJ by a valuation As which differs from Au at most
on one place, namely in Vs(c). Therefore, cεa is SATF,uOBJ. But it cannot
be satisfied. From this contradiction, the left side of the equivalence
results. ...
 8 Axiom 3 is validF.
The proof is exactly the same as in the case of Theorem 7.
 9 Axiom 4 is validF.
: The proof of implication to the right is the same, as in the proof of
Theorem 7.
Implication to the left: Assume that ∃c(aεc ∧ cεb) is SATF,uOBJ. Obviously,
there is a valuation As which differs from Au only in the value assigned
co c, such that aεc∧cεb is SATF,sOBJ. Hence, aεc is SATF,sOBJ. But it cannot
be the case. Therefore, from contradiction, we obtain the left side of the
equivalence. ...
3.3 -   ⊂–
3.3.1  5
In this axiom the primitive term is ε –the functor of singular exclusion. In
standard interpretation, intuitively, it yields true statement with its arguments
a, b iff a is an unshared name, and b does not name the object named by a (it
does not matter, whether b is unshared, shared, or empty).
Formally, we can accommodate the definition of satisfactionε to make ε the
primitive term. Instead of first condition of the definition of satisfactionε, we
simply introduce:
 15 pµkεµiq is satisfiedε in OBJ by a valuation Au iff ∃!xx ∈ Ak ∧
¬∃y[y ∈ Ak ∧ y ∈ Ai]
We will now show that the Axiom 5 is valid also in some unintended interpret-
ations of ε.
According to the Definition 8, aεb is (in systems with ε as primitive func-
tor) defined by means of aεa ∧ ¬(aεb). Let us follow this intuition, using the
notion of satisfactionΦ. We obtain:
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 16 µkεµi is satisfiedΦ inOBJ byAu iffµkεµk∧¬(µkεµi) is satisfiedΦ
inOBJ byAu.
In terms of model theory, it is equivalent to:
 17 µkεµi is satisfiedΦ inOBJ byAu iff Vu(µk) = Φ∧ Vu(µi) 6= Φ.
In an intuitive manner: µk is empty and µi is not empty.
 10 Axiom 5 is validΦ.
:Implication to the right: Assume aεb is SATΦ,uOBJ. Then, Vu(a) = Φ ∧
Vu(b) 6= Φ.
There exists a valuation As which differs from Au at most in the fact,
that Vs(c) = Φ, such that cεb ∧ ¬(cεa) is SATΦ,sOBJ. It is so, because
Vs(c) = Φ, Vs(b) 6= Φ, and it is not the case that both: Vs(c) = Φ and
Vs(a) 6= Φ.19
Hence, ∃c(cεb∧ ¬(cεa)) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Now, assume additionally that cεd ∧ dεe is SATΦ,uOBJ. It means that Φ ,
Vu(d) 6= Φ, Vu(d) = Φ, and Vu(e) 6= Φ. Obviously, we have a contra-
diction. Hence, we obtain by p ∧ ¬p → q that semantic conditions of
satisfactionΦ of cεa∨ dεa are fulfilled, and cεa∨ dεa is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: Assume ∃c(cεb∧¬(cεa))∧∀c,d,e(cεd∧dεe→ dεa)
is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Since ∃c(cεb ∧ ¬(cεa)) is SATΦ,uOBJ, there exists a valuation As differing
from Au at most in the value assigned to c, such that cεb ∧ ¬(cεa) is
SATΦ,sOBJ. It means that Vs(c) = Φ, Vs(b) 6= Φ. Moreover, it implies
that it is not the case, that both: Vs(c) = Φ and Vs(a) 6= Φ. Since
Vs(c) = Φ, obviously Vs(a) = Φ. According to our understanding of
As, Vu(a) = Vs(a) and Vu(b) = Vs(b). Therefore, Vu(b) 6= Φ and
Vu(a) = Φ. Therefore, aεb is SATΦ,sOBJ. This reasoning can be repeated
for any OBJ and any Au. This ends the proof. ...
We can also follow Definition 8 using the notion of satisfactionF. We obtain:
 18 aεb is satisfiedF inOBJ byAu iff Vu(a) 6= Vu(a).
 11 Axiom 5 is validF.
: Implication to the right: Assume aεb is SATF,uOBJ. Obviously, it cannot
be satisfied. From this contradiction, we obtain the right side of the
equivalence.
19Since Vu(a) = Vs(a) and Vu(b) = Vs(b).
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Implication to the left: Assume ∃c(cεb∧¬(cεa))∧∀c,d,e(cεd∧dεe→ dεa)
is SATF,uOBJ.
Since ∃c(cεb ∧ ¬(cεa)) is SATF,uOBJ, there exists a valuation As differing
from Au at most in the value assigned to c, such that cεb ∧ ¬(cεa) is
SATF,sOBJ. It implies that cεb is SATF,sOBJ. But it cannot be satisfied. Hence,
by contradiction, we obtain the left side of the equivalence. ...
3.3.2  6
Sobocin´ski’s axiomatization has < as the only primitive functor. Let us follow
the Definition 9 according to the definition of satisfactionΦ. Our semantics
yields the result that interpretationΦ of < is the same as the interpretationΦ
of ε.
 12 Axiom 6 is validΦ.
:Implication to the right: Assume a < b is SATΦ,uOBJ. Hence Vu(a) =
Vu(b) = Φ. There exists a valuation As differing from Au at most in the
value assigned to c, such that Vs(c) = Φ. Obviously c < a is SATΦ,sOBJ.
Therefore, ∃cc < a is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Now assume additionally, that c < a is SATΦ,uOBJ. Then Vu(c) = Φ. Since
Vu(b) = Φ, it is clear that Vu(c) = Vu(b) = Φ, and c < b is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Therefore ∀c(c < a → c < b) is SATΦ,uOBJ. Then also ∀c(c < a ∧ ∀d(d <
c→ c < d) → c < b) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: Assume ∃cc < a∧ ∀c(c < a∧ ∀d(d < c→ c < d) →
c < b) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Since ∃cc < a is SATΦ,uOBJ, there exists a valuation As differing from Au
at most in the value assigned to c, such that Vs(c) = Vs(a) = Φ. Since
Vs(a) = Vu(a), clearly Vu(a) = Φ.
According to our assumption, ∀c(c < a∧ ∀d(d < c→ c < d) → c < b) is
SATΦ,uOBJ. Moreover, ∀d(d < c → c < d) is validΦ, since identity for sets
is symmetrical. Hence ∀c(c < a→ c < b) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Obviously a < a is SATΦ,uOBJ(because Vu(a) = Vu(a) = Φ). Then, in
accordance with the valid implication above (∀c(c < a → c < b)), also
a < b is SATΦ,uOBJ. This result ends our proof. ...
We can also follow this definition by means of the definition of satisfactionF.
The resulting interpretationF of < is the same as the interpretationF of ε.
 13 Axiom 6 is validF.
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: Implication to the right: Assume a < b is SATF,uOBJ. Since it cannot be
satisfied, we have contradiction, and the right side of the equivalence
follows obviously.
Implication to the left: Assume ∃cc < a is SATF,uOBJ. Then for some valu-
ation As differing at most in the value assigned to c, c < a is SATF,sOBJ.
Since it cannot be the case, we obtain contradiction, which yields the
needed statement. ...
3.3.3 A 7
The primitive term of Ontology based on this axiom is ⊂. Let us find a non-
standard interpretation of this functor, following the definition of satisfactionΦ
and the Definition 11. It is defined by means of ∀c(cεa→ cεb). Hence, we can
introduce the following:
 19 pµk ⊂ µiq is satisfiedΦ inOBJ by a valuationAu if and only if
Ak = Φ→ Ai = Φ
It is clear that this interpretation is far from standard. We shall now prove the
following:
 14 Axiom 7 is validΦ.
: Implication to the right: Assume a ⊂ b is SATΦ,uOBJ. It implies that if
Vu(a) = Φ then also Vu(b) = Φ.
Assume additionally that c ⊂ a is SATΦ,uOBJand Vu(c) = Φ. It means,
that if Vu(c) = Φ, then also Vu(a) = Φ. From this assumptions we
obtain that Vu(a) = Φ, and, since Vu(a) = Φ → Vu(b) = Φ, obviously
Vu(b) = Φ.
Therefore, also c ⊂ b is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: This part of the proof will be indirect. Assume the
following:
1. a ⊂ b is not SATΦ,uOBJ.
2. ∀c(c ⊂ a∧ ∀d,e(d ⊂ c→ c ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e) → c ⊂ b) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Obviously (by the semantic correlate of universal instantiation) also
a ⊂ a∧ ∀d,e(d ⊂ a→ a ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e) → a ⊂ b) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
It is clear that Vu(a) = Φ→ Vu(a) = Φ. Hence, a ⊂ a is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Now, from the first assumption, it is not the case that Vu(a) = Φ →
Vu(b) = Φ. Hence Vu(a) = Φ∧ Vu(b) 6= Φ is SATΦ,uOBJ.
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Now assume that d ⊂ a is SATΦ,uOBJ. Clearly, no matter what the value
of d is, either Vu(d) = Φ, or Vu(d) 6= Φ. In the first case, Vu(a) =
Φ → Vu(d) = Φ, and a ⊂ d is SATΦ,uOBJ. In the second case, obviously
Vu(d) = Φ → Vu(e) = Φ (no matter, what the value of e is, since the
antecedent is false). In both cases, a ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Therefore, ∀d,e(d ⊂ a→ a ⊂ d∨ d ⊂ e) is SATΦ,uOBJ.
Now, by modus ponendo ponens , we obtain the consequence that a ⊂ b
is SATΦ,uOBJ. This gives us contradiction with the assumption of indirect
proof. This result ends our proof. ...
Clearly, our method works also when we follow the definition of satisfactionF.
According to Definition 11 we obtain:
 20 pµk ⊂ µiq is satisfiedF in OBJ by a valuation Au if and only if
Ak = Ak.
In this interpretation ⊂ is a verum functor which yields the value 1 for any
arguments. We claim:
 15 Axiom 7 is validF.
: Implication to the right: Assume a ⊂ b is SATF,uOBJ.
Clearly, c ⊂ b is SATF,uOBJ, since Vu(c) = Vu(c). Therefore, also the whole
implication on the right side of equivalence is SATF,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: Similarly — a ⊂ b is SATF,uOBJ(because Vu(a) =
Vu(a)). Therefore whole the implication which has a ⊂ b as consequent
is SATF,uOBJ. This ends our proof. ...
3.4   - 
As we have said elsewhere [21], there are 216 possible interpretations of a given
functor of the category sn,n . The claim that an axiom determines exactly one
of this meanings is therefore quite a strong claim. In this section we shall
indicate that the two interpretations presented above are not the only two
possible non-standard interpretation.
However, our treatment of this issue will be less precise that the deliber-
ations led to this point. We will only prove our theorems for the Axiom 4.
Clearly, those claims can be applied to other axioms. We omit these theor-
ems and their proofs just for the sake of convenience. We can, for example,
introduce the following inductive condition of satisfaction.:
 21 µkεµi is satisfiedα inOBJ byAu iff ∃x6=y[x ∈ Ak∧y ∈ Ak∧Ak =
Ai].
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In other words, in interpretationα we understand ε as identity of exten-
sions having more that one element.
 16 Axiom 4 is validα.
: Implication to the right: Assume aεb is SATα,uOBJ. It means that Vu(a)
and Vu(b) are non empty, identical and not unary. There is a valuation
As which differs from Au at most in the fact that Vs(c) = Vs(a). Clearly
aεc∧ cεb is SATα,sOBJ.
Therefore, ∃c(aεc∧ cεb) is SATα,uOBJ.
Implication to the left: Assume that ∃c(aεc∧ cεb) is SATα,uOBJ. Then, there
is a valuation As which differs from Au at most in the fact that Vs(c) =
Vs(a). Clearly aεc ∧ cεb is SATα,sOBJ and sets Vs(a), Vs(b), Vs(c) are
identical, nonempty and not unary.
Since Vs(a) = Vu(a) and Vs(b) = Vu(b), it is obvious that Vu(a) and
Vu(b) are identical, nonempty and not unary. Therefore, aεb is SATα,uOBJ.
This ends the proof. ...
 22 µkεµi is satisfiedβ inOBJ byAu iff ∃!x[x ∈ Ak ∧Ak = Ai].
According to the definition of satisfactionβ, we interpret ε as the identity of
unary extensions of given arguments.
 17 Axiom 4 is validβ.
The proof of Theorem 17 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 16.
 23 µkεµi is satisfiedγ inOBJ byAu iff ∃x[x ∈ Ak ∧Ak = Ai].
According to satisfactionγ, we interpret ε as identity of nonempty extensions
of given arguments.
 18 Axiom 4 is validγ.
As before, the proof of Theorem 18 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 16.
The list of hitherto given interpretations of primitive functors of Les´niew-
ski’s Ontology is not a complete list of possible interpretations of primitive
constants of Ontology which keep axioms valid.
3.5    —  
Some of the interpretations of ε mentioned above represent a particular in-
stances of a more general situation. These are, to speak freely, these interpret-
ations of ε, which imply identity.20
20Strictly speaking: a given interpretation ψ of atomic sentences defined by the condition of
the kind: ‘aεb is SATψ,uOBJ iff ψ(a, b)’ implies identity iff ψ(a, b) implies Vu(a) = Vu(b).
“Some non-standard interpretations of Les´niewski’s Ontology”, Australasian Journal of Logic (3) 2006, 13–46
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2006 39
In a language with identity of individuals we can easily define predicates:
‘has exactly (at least, at most) n elements’. Hence, we can introduce ℵ0 defin-
itions of satisfaction by constructing the basic condition according to this
scheme:
[ ] µkεµi is satisfiedn(>n/6n) in OBJ by Au iff
Ak = Ai and Ak has exactly (at least/ at most) n elements.
where n is a natural number. We observe:
 19 Any satisfaction defined in accordance with the  
makes all axioms given in this paper valid.
We have already given proofs of this theorem for some particular notions of nu-
merical satisfaction— satisfactionΦ, satisfactionα, satisfactionβ, satisfactionγ.
Proof of this theorem is an easy generalization of proofs of corresponding
claims for these interpretations. Such proofs have been already given. The
proof needed now is constructed from those by replacing a particular numer-
ical description21 by ‘has (have) exactly (at least/ at most) n elements’.
4   
We shall begin with the application of this rule to the basic language, i. e. with
the schema
From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer ∀χ[χ(λ) ≡ χ(δ)]
It will be convenient to begin with a lemma saying that if the rule works for
χ = ϕ and for χ = ψ, then it works for expressions composed from ϕ and ψ by
the rules of  (conjunction, negation, quantification). This is the most trivial
part of a full proof of our main claim for this rule. We can prove it in general,
and later on prove only the first condition of inductive proof for different cases
separately.
L 1 If the two schemata are validity-preserving:
From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer [ϕ(λ) ≡ ϕ(δ)]
From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer [ψ(λ) ≡ ψ(δ)]
then, also the following schemata are validity-preserving:
1. From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer [ϕ(λ)∧ψ(λ) ≡ ϕ(δ)∧ψ(δ)]
2. From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer [¬ϕ(λ) ≡ ¬ϕ(δ)]
3. From ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] infer [∀µϕ(λ) ≡ ∀µϕ(δ)]
21Like, for example, ‘is non-empty’ or ‘has at least two elements’.
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: Assume that the rule is validity-preserving for ϕ and ψ. Assume that
∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] is valid. Hence, we can infer ϕ(λ) ≡ ϕ(δ) and ψ(λ) ≡ ψ(δ).
The cases of conjunction and negation result from, respectively:
(p ≡ q)∧ (r ≡ s) → ((p∧ r) ≡ (q∧ s))
(p ≡ q) → (¬p ≡ ¬q)
Regarding quantification: Since ∀µ(ϕ(λ)) and ∀µ(ϕ(δ)) must have λ and
δ as free variables22, clearly λ 6= µ and δ 6= µ. We have now two possibil-
ities: either µ occurs in ϕ, or not. If it does not occur in ϕ, it, to say it
loosely, it does not contribute to the value of ϕ(λ) or ϕ(δ). If µ occurs
in φ as a bound variable, the addition of superfluous quantification also
changes nothing in the value of whole expressions. So the only interest-
ing case remaining is that µ occurs in φ as a free variable. (Note that we
already have ϕ(λ) ≡ ϕ(δ).)
If this is valid, then for any OBJ and for any valuation of free variables
(µ among them) ϕ(λ) is equivalent to ϕ(δ). Clearly, then, [for any valu-
ation of µ, ϕ(λ)] is equivalent to [for any valuation of µ, ϕ(δ)]. Hence,
[∀µϕ(λ) ≡ ∀µϕ(δ)] is valid. ...
With the aid of this result, we can easily give proofs that the rule of exten-
sionality is validity-preserving for a given interpretation. Since Lemma 1 works
for any interpretation, to complete an inductive proof it will suffice to prove a
claim about the basic condition only.
 20 Rule of extensionality is validityΦ-preserving.
: To prove this claim we shall prove that if ∀x[xελ ≡ xεδ] is validΦ,
then the following schemata are validΦ:
1. γελ ≡ γεδ
2. λεγ ≡ δεγ
In fact, the first case is obvious (check our semantics for the universal
quantifier). The second results from the fact that the relation of ‘being
simultaneously empty’ is symmetrical.
Indeed, these two cases exhaust all possibilities of ‘atomic’ formulas in
which both λ and δ occur at the same position. Together with Lemma 1
this fact yields a complete inductive proof for .
...
22See the formulation of the rule of extensionality.
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We can prove a more general claim:
 21 Rule of extensionality preserves validity in  for any interpretation of
ε constructed in accordance with the schema of numerical identity.
: Assume that
∀x(xελ ≡ xεδ)
is valid. It follows that for anyOBJ and any valuation u of name variables
in this model, any (and only) subset of OBJ which is nI with EVu(λ) is
nI with EVu(δ).23 This implies that EVu(λ) and EVu(δ) are nI with each
other (and each of them is nI with itself ). If these semantic values are
identical, it does not matter which of these: λ or δ, occur in an expression
— since satisfaction is defined in terms of extensions of names and name
variables and their power (the latter is preserved by identity). So, in fact,
always any expression with λ is equivalent with the same expression after
replacing λ by δ. ...
This proof seems to be quite plausible, mutatis mutandis, for the case of name-
and sentence-formative functors. Hence:
 3 Rule of extensionality preserves validity in the full language of Onto-
logy for any interpretation of ε constructed in accordance with the schema of numerical
identity.
Almost all interpretations considered in this paper fall under the schema for
numerical identity. The only interpretation which need an independent proof
is the notion of satisfactionF.
 22 Rule of extensionality preserves validityF in .
: We need to prove only the basic case (for atomic expressions). Indeed,
the antecedent of the rule of extensionality itself is a valid expression,
for any δ and λ (both arguments of the equivalence are always false).24
Now, clearly all atomic sentences are equivalent — they are always false.
Thanks to Lemma 1 we obtain a full inductive proof. ...
Presumably, the above proof works, mutatis mutandis, for the full language of
Ontology.
23We say shortly ‘nI’ instead of ’n-numerically identical’ where ‘n-numerical identity’ replaces
’being identical and having exactly/at least/at most n elements’. We hope that this abbreviation
will not cause any ambiguity.
24It does not indicate, however, that we can (syntactically) prove this antecedent in the axio-
matic system under consideration.
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5   
It is quite clear that:
 23 The rule of definition is validityF-preserving in the basic language of
Ontology.
: For the case of definitions proposition-formative functors, the case
is simple, because the interpretation of ε is not relevant for the validity
of such definitions. For the case of definitions of nominal constants and
of name-formative functors note, that such a definition:
(a) Has an atomic expression as definiendum.
(b) Has at least one atomic expression as a part of a conjunction in the
definiens.
Since any atomic expression is unsatisfiableF, it follows that both the
definiendum and definiens of any such definition are unsatisfiable. Hence,
any such definition (since it is an equivalence) is valid. ...
Nevertheless, an anonymous referee of this paper has given an interesting argu-
ment for the claim that in the interpretationΦ of ε the rule of definition ‘is not
truth preserving’ in the Φ-interpretation. This arguments sheds some light on
important issues connected with this rule. I am really grateful to this referee,
because his comment, relevant indeed, reminded me of some issues neglected
in the first version of this paper.
Let us start with the argument itself before adding a comment.25







When we introduce this definition, we can prove ¬⋂ ε⋂ in Onto-
logy, which is false according to Φ-interpretation.
 In fact, the rule of definition allows us to introduce D⋂ as a the-
orem. Since it is only ‘one-step’-rule, its validity-preserving property consists
in the fact that any expression introduced by means of this rule is valid.26
25I wholeheartedly hope that the referee does not mind quoting his argument.
26Please note, that for our purpose it suffices to consider the property of being validity-
preserving (which in fact, for rules of introducing sentences, coincides with being truth-
preserving). As we will see, expressions introduced by means of this rule will not have to be
sentences. Especially, the so-called quasi-constants (we shall explain this notion soon) are, in
some sense, free in such ‘definitions’ in some non-standard interpretations. To resume — valid-
ity preserving is the weakest property we need, so we will be concerned with it (and not with
truth-preserving property) in our further deliberations.
“Some non-standard interpretations of Les´niewski’s Ontology”, Australasian Journal of Logic (3) 2006, 13–46
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2006 43
On the other hand, it is a wholly different question, whether expressions in-
troduced by means of this rule determine constant denotations of expressions
defined in these definitions. This may be clearly seen on the example of D⋂.
Indeed, we can see that it does not ‘determine’ the standard denotation of ⋂.
Colloquially speaking, we may read D⋂ in our Φ-interpretation rather as:27
For any name a, a is empty together with ⋂ iff (a is empty with
itself and it is not the case that a is empty with itself ).
It follows that for no a it is the case that aε⋂. But, in our interpretation (Φ)
it does not mean that ⋂ is the empty name. To the contrary, it means that
no name is empty together with ⋂, so we should rather call ⋂ ‘the non-empty
name’ (whether the usage of ‘the’ before ‘non-empty name’ is legitimate is itself
debatable).
This fact indicates that when we apply the Φ-interpretation (and possibly,
some other interpretations) to definitions of Ontology, they may not determine
the semantics of defined expressions.28 We can now understand ⋂ in many
different ways, as far as we assign in any OBJ a non-empty set as its semantic
correlate.
Regardless, if we interpret ⋂ as a non-empty name (as we are forced to do by
D⋂ in the Φ-interpretation), no surprise (and, moreover, no contradiction)





But we cannot read it as ‘the empty name is not empty together with itself ’
(which is false), but rather: ‘a non-empty name is not empty together with
itself ’ (which is true).
To summarize, when we change the meaning of constants of a given lan-
guage, this shapes also our account of definitions built in this language — we
have to apply our new semantics also to definitions.
  Nevertheless, the referee is quite right: the rule
is not validity-preserving in some non-standard interpretations. It surely is
not validity-preserving in any numerical interpretation where n > 2, if we put
no restrictions on the validity/unsatisfiability of χ occurring in the definition.
Consider the following:
D ∗ ∀a[aε∗ ≡ aεa∧ (aεa∨ ¬aεa)]
This expression obviously fails in numerous cases of n-identity. For ex-
ample, read ε as denoting the relation: ‘has at most 5 elements and is identical
27I hope that this reading will suffice. Anyone who feels that the full formal reading is neces-
sary, is free to read it accordingly.
28It is interesting question, whether definitions originally in fact determined such semantics.
Anyway, even if they do not determine this semantics, it does not mean that they are not valid.
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with’, and let χ be valid (like in D∗). Let OBJ be a model under considera-
tion. We obtain the result that ∗ denotes a subset V(∗) of OBJ, such that
any A ⊆ OBJ which has at most n elements, (has at most n elements and) is
identical with V(∗). Let OBJ = {x, y, z}, B = {1, 2}, C = {2, 3}, B,C ⊆ OBJ.
Clearly both B and C have at most 5 elements. Hence, A = V(∗), B = V(∗).
Therefore: A = B, which is false.
There are, however, at least two non-standard interpretations, in which this
rule is validity preserving - F-interpretation, and Φ-interpretation.
Generally, the question whether the rule of definition is validity preserving
in non-standard interpretations gives rise to quite complicated deliberations.
The restrictions put on possible non-standard interpretation of ε by introdu-
cing the rule of definition (or the other way round - the restrictions put on
this rule by introducing some non-standard interpretations) constitute a wide
problem which I cannot discuss fully in this paper. I hope that I will be able to
come back to this issue in a separate paper.
6 
We have proposed quite an intuitive understanding of the expression ‘an axiom
determines the meaning of the only specific constant occurring in it’ and ‘the
meaning of a given constant is determined axiomatically’. We have introduced
some basic semantics for functors of category sn,n of Les´niewski’s Ontology.
Using this results we have proven that the popular claim that axioms of Onto-
logy determine the meaning of primitive constants (functors), or that an axio-
matic basis of Ontology determines the meaning of the primitive constant of
this basis, is false.29
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